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1123 
KIDS, DRUGS, AND SCHOOL INTERVENTION: 
HOW FAR CAN A PUBLIC SCHOOL GO IN DRUG 
TESTING ITS STUDENTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court determined that school 
districts could constitutionally require student-athletes to submit to 
suspicionless drug testing.1 During the summer of 2002, the Supreme 
Court decided Board of Education v. Earls and widened the scope of 
student drug testing by holding that high school students participating in 
extracurricular activities such as Future Farmers of America, show choir, 
concert band, and student government could also be required to submit to 
drug tests.2 After the Earls decision, many school board members, 
administrators, and parents have been left questioning how far a school 
can go in drug testing its students.3 
 
 
 1. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). The Court held Vernonia School 
District’s policy of drug testing all student-athletes reasonable and constitutional because of the 
students’ “decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity 
of the need met by the search.” Id. at 664-65.  
 2. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). The Supreme Court found that Tecumseh Public School’s drug-testing 
policy, which applies to all students participating in extracurricular activities, is “a reasonable means 
of furthering the School District’s important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its 
schoolchildren.” Id. at 838. 
 3. See Tamar Lewin, With Court Nod, Parents Debate School Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2002, at 1. The author here notes “[w]hile the court ruling resolved some of the legal questions, it 
did nothing to end the controversy about whether drug testing programs make sense as educational 
policy.” Id. at 34. The author claims schools are debating about whether to implement voluntary 
programs with incentives for encouraging students to participate, or programs involving mandatory 
testing of all students. Id. There also appears to be division as to whether programs should focus on 
punishment or counseling and treatment. Id.  
 See also Linda Cagnetti, Editorial, Drug Testing: Should Schools Screen Students?: Pragmatism 
Trumps Idealism in Crises, CINC. ENQ., Aug. 25, 2002, at F1; Ray Cooklis, Editorial, Drug Testing: 
Should Schools Screen Students?: Court Ruling Gives Kids Awful Civics Lesson, CINC. ENQ., Aug. 25, 
2002, at F1. The two authors debate whether the Earls court made the correct decision. Cagnetti argues 
that rather than singling out those students who participate in extracurricular activities, schools should 
implement mandatory testing for “all middle- and high-school students.” Id. She states, “[w]e already 
require students to have physical exams and vaccinations against disease. We use vision and hearing 
tests to alert us to problems. Drug use is a serious problem.” Id. Cooklis, on the other hand, argues that 
“[s]uch invasive, arbitrary and fallible tests and the threat of sanctions they inherently carry could 
drive students away from extracurricular activities, leaving them more vulnerable to unsavory 
activities such as, oh, let’s see, drug use.” Id. Cooklis argues “this clumsy, overbroad ruling opens the 
door wide to further diminishing the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure 
that all of us should enjoy.” Id. 
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Governmentally-mandated drug testing constitutes a search and seizure 
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment,4 so in analyzing school drug 
testing,5 the Court must decide whether such searches are reasonable.6 The 
Court makes this determination by balancing the government’s need to 
search against the nature of the privacy interests involved.7 The Supreme 
Court has held that schools may constitutionally drug test students 
participating in extracurricular activities because the schools’ interest in 
preventing and/or deterring drug use, and the efficacy of suspicionless 
drug testing in furthering those interests, outweighs students’ low 
expectations of privacy.8 
This Note is intended to provide a practical guide for schools that wish 
to implement drug testing policies but remain uncertain as to what is 
constitutionally permissible in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent 
 
 
 4.  The Fourth Amendment secures the “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). In these two cases, the Supreme Court held that drug testing mandated by 
the government constitutes a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In Schmerber, the 
defendant was taken to the hospital for injuries sustained after a car accident. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
758. He was arrested there for driving under the influence of alcohol and a sample of his blood was 
drawn, without his consent, for chemical analysis. Id. Evidence of the blood alcohol content of his 
blood was introduced as evidence at his trial and he was subsequently convicted. Id. at 758-59. The 
Court found “[i]t could not reasonably be argued . . . that the administration of the blood test in this 
case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly constitute 
searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that 
Amendment.” Id. at 767.  
 In Skinner, the Court faced the issue of whether, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the 
Federal Railroad Administration, drug testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents 
violated the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. The Court considered whether the testing 
amounted to a search or seizure (and therefore implicated the Fourth Amendment) and concluded 
“[b]ecause it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that 
society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded 
unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 617.  
 5. Public school officials are state actors for constitutional purposes. “In carrying out searches 
and other disciplinary functions . . . school officials act as representatives of the State . . . and they 
cannot claim . . . immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 
U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985).  
 6.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). The defendants in this case were confronted by a 
police officer on the street who, pursuant to his suspicions of unlawful conduct, stopped the defendants 
and conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Id. at 5-7. The Court determined that employing a 
balancing test between the state’s interest in the search, evidenced by an officer’s reasonable and 
articulable suspicion, and the individual’s privacy interests was the only way to analyze whether the 
search met the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 20-21. The Court found 
that a “stop and frisk,” when supported by an officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion, is 
constitutional. Id. at 30-31. 
 8. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.  
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decisions. In Part II, this Note will outline the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence leading up to the validation of suspicionless drug testing in 
public schools and will discuss at length the two cases in which the 
Supreme Court has approved drug testing of public school students. Part 
III will then explain and attempt to answer some of the constitutional 
questions with which schools are still grappling. Part IV will include 
practical suggestions for schools wishing to implement constitutionally-
sound drug testing policies. 
II. HISTORY 
The Supreme Court continues to expand the boundaries of 
constitutional school drug testing.9 Because of this evolving jurisprudence, 
determining whether a school’s drug testing policy passes constitutional 
muster can pose difficulties. Any analysis of a school’s drug testing policy 
must begin with the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and “Reasonableness”  
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”10 To determine whether 
the Fourth Amendment is implicated, a court must first decide whether a 
search has occurred.11 This involves assessing whether the individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.12 Intuitively, one 
would assume individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to their bodily fluids and functions and indeed, the Supreme Court 
has held as much.13 Therefore, the collection and testing of bodily fluids 
for the presence of drugs is clearly a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.14  
 
 
 9. Originally limited to student-athletes, school drug-testing policies may now provide for the 
testing of any students participating in extracurricular activities. See supra note 1 and accompanying 
text; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 11. See John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 R’s of Drug Testing in Public Schools: Random is 
Reasonable and Rights are Reduced, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (May 1996). The author explains 
“[b]efore deciding whether a particular action violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, a 
court must find a government action resulting in a ‘search or seizure’.” Id. at 1225 (citing Skinner v. 
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)).  
 12. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (finding “wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation 
of privacy,’ . . . he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1967))). 
 13. See Schmerber, supra note 4.  
 14. Id.; see also Skinner, supra note 4. 
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Once a court has determined that a search has occurred, it must next 
analyze whether the search was reasonable.15 To determine the 
reasonableness of a search, a court must first assess whether the 
government acted pursuant to a warrant; if not, the search is per se 
unreasonable unless it fits into one of the “few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions,”16 or meets the “reasonableness” requirement 
even without a warrant and without a showing of probable cause.17  
The “few specifically established exceptions” together may be referred 
to as situations in which exigent circumstances are present; when such 
circumstances exist, searches conducted without a warrant but with 
probable cause may be found to be reasonable.18 In Warden v. Hayden, the 
Court found that the police officers’ warrantless search for a robbery 
suspect in a private home was reasonable because the exigencies of that 
situation, including both the officers’ and the general public’s safety, made 
an immediate search imperative.19 Courts have also found that the 
destruction or removal of evidence20 and the inherent mobility of 
automobiles21 could create exigent circumstances.22  
 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by 
telephone. FBI agents had recorded phone calls the defendant made from a public phone booth by 
attaching electronic listening and recording devices to the outside of the booth. Id. at 348. The 
Supreme Court overturned his conviction, holding the search unconstitutional because the agents failed 
to obtain a warrant and because the circumstances surrounding the search did not fit into any 
established exception from the warrant requirement. Id. at 356-58. The Court reaffirmed that “searches 
conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” 
unless they fit into one of the established exceptions. Id. at 357. 
 17. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. 
 18. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967). 
 19. Id. at 298-99 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). In this case, the 
police believed an armed robber entered a private home “less than five minutes before they reached it,” 
and the court stated “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of 
an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Id. at 298-99. 
 20. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 6.5(b), at 659 (2d ed. 1987), cited in ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND RELATED 
AREAS, 676 (3d ed. 1995); but see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970). In Vale, the Court 
found the warrantless search of the defendant’s home unconstitutional. After arresting the defendant 
for possessing narcotics, the police searched the home when the defendant’s mother and brother 
arrived and attempted to enter the home. The state argued that the possibility that the mother and 
brother would destroy the narcotics in the home before the police could obtain a warrant justified the 
search. The Court decided otherwise, stating that the circumstances present in the case did not fit into 
any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement: “The officers were not responding to an emergency. 
They were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. The goods ultimately seized were not in the process of 
destruction.” Id. at 35 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).  
 Despite the language in Vale, Professor LaFave asserts that lower courts have stated the 
“destruction of evidence” exception in broader terms, such as “a great likelihood that the evidence will 
be destroyed or removed” or that police have “reasonably conclude[d] that the evidence will be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/7
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Despite the lack of a warrant or a showing of probable cause, some 
searches have still been deemed reasonable by the Court.23 The Supreme 
Court has traditionally employed a balancing test in analyzing these 
searches for reasonableness, stating “there is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) 
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.’”24 In order to 
make use of this exception to the warrant requirement, the government 
“must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which . . . 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”25 Searches that have been deemed 
“reasonable” under this balancing test include “stop and frisk” searches,26 
searches incident to arrest,27 inventory searches,28 and border patrol 
searches.29  
 
 
destroyed or removed.” 2 LAFAVE, supra, at 658, quoted in ALLEN, KUHNS, AND STUNTZ, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH 
AMENDMENTS AND RELATED AREAS, 676 (3d ed. 1995). 
 21. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
518 U.S. 938 (1996); United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Patterson, 65 F.3d 68 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993). The 
“moving vehicle exception” is based upon (1) the mobility of vehicles, and (2) the reduced expectation 
of privacy of those in vehicles. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-56. The court in Markling held that the 
exception applies when vehicles are used on highways or found stationary in places not normally used 
as residences. Markling, 7 F.3d at 1319 (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)). The 
exception requires officers to show probable cause that the vehicle in question may contain 
contraband. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. Probable cause can be established in many ways; for example, 
the Court in McClinton held probable cause was established by an informant’s tip and police work 
corroborating that tip. McClinton, 135 F.3d at 1184. In Labron, probable cause was established by a 
police officer’s visual confirmation that the suspect loaded drugs into the trunk of the car and by the 
officer’s observation that a second suspect behaved as though he had drugs in his truck. Labron, 518 
U.S. at 940. Finally, the Patterson court found probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability” 
that contraband or other evidence of criminal activity exists. Patterson, 65 F.3d at 71. 
 22. Exigent circumstances may also justify warrantless seizures under the “plain view” doctrine, 
which allows police officers to seize items that are in plain view when those officers are acting 
lawfully (i.e., pursuant to a warrant or under a valid exigency exception) in conducting a search. See 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (holding so long as officers did not violate Fourth 
Amendment by presence in place from which item seized was in “plain view,” incriminating character 
of item is immediately apparent, and officer has right to access item, warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence is valid); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987). See 
generally ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND RELATED AREAS 703-06 (Little, Brown and Co., ed., 
3d ed. 1995). 
 23. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 7 (finding officer’s “stop and frisk” of individuals on a sidewalk 
was reasonable). 
 24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 
(1967)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Terry, supra note 7.  
 27. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The police arrived at the defendant’s home 
with an arrest warrant authorizing the arrest of the defendant for burglary. Id. at 753. Upon presenting 
the defendant with the warrant, the officers asked if they might look around the house; the defendant 
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Over the years, Supreme Court justices have disagreed about whether a 
balancing test for determining “reasonableness” may be employed to allow 
for suspicionless searches that do not fit into one of the above-mentioned 
exceptions.30 Recently, the Court has used a balancing test31 to justify 
suspicionless searches of the workplaces of public employees32 and the 
 
 
objected, but the police claimed that incident to his arrest they had a right to search the home. Id. at 
753-54. The police searched every room of the house, even opening drawers and moving belongings 
around in order to find evidence. Id. at 754. The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding 
searches incident to arrest are reasonable only when limited in scope to the arrestee and area within 
his/her immediate control. Id. at 768. 
 28. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Officers arrested the defendant for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 368. While waiting for a tow truck to arrive and transport the 
defendant’s car to an impoundment lot, one of the officers “inventoried” the contents of the vehicle. Id. 
at 368-69. The officer found both drugs and drug paraphernalia, and the defendant was subsequently 
charged with driving under the influence as well as possession of drugs with intent to distribute. Id. at 
369. The Supreme Court held inventory procedures administered when a vehicle is impounded, if 
administered in good faith pursuant to police regulations, are reasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 374. 
 29. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). The defendant arrived in 
Los Angeles on a flight from Columbia and was detained at the customs desk. Id. at 533. Customs 
officials suspected the defendant was a “balloon swallower,” a drug smuggler who transports drugs in 
balloons that are swallowed and then passed through bowel movements. Id. at 534. The defendant was 
detained for nearly 16 hours while officials waited for her to agree to an X-ray or have a bowel 
movement that they could inspect. Id. at 535. The Court held “the detention of a traveler at the border, 
beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs 
agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the 
traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.” Id. at 541.  
 30. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 22. The authors discuss the disagreements that have arisen 
occasionally amongst various Supreme Court justices as to the propriety of employing a balancing test 
in considering possible exceptions to the probable cause requirement. The authors frame the issue as 
follows: “Does one start with the premise . . . that probable cause defines the appropriate balance 
except in a few narrowly defined situations? Or does one start with the premise . . . that at least if the 
intrusion is relatively minor, it is appropriate to evaluate the reasonableness of the activity in terms of 
a Camara-Terry type balancing test?” Id. 
 31. The balancing test referred to here was first set out in Terry. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. The test took on its current form in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 
(1979). One scholar explains the test set out in Prouse as adding “two prongs to the Camara test,” 
[upon which the Terry test was based], so that the Court should not only weigh the governmental 
interest in the search against the individual’s interest in privacy but should also examine the nature of 
the intrusion and the efficacy of the search in achieving the state’s goals. Joanna Raby, Note, 
Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-Wide Drug Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999, 
1007 (1999).  
 32. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding warrant and probable cause not 
required when a search of an employee workplace has a noninvestigatory work-related purpose or the 
investigatory purpose of searching for evidence of employee misconduct).  
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drug testing of employees pursuant to federal regulations33 based upon the 
“special needs”34 of the government to regulate these areas.  
As stated by Justice Blackmun in New Jersey v. T.L.O., “[o]nly in those 
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for 
that of the Framers.”35 Therefore, a finding of special needs gives the 
Court permission to employ the “reasonableness” balancing test.36  
The “special needs” doctrine undoubtedly applies in public school 
settings, for in schools “the special need for an immediate response to 
behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or 
the education process itself” warrants the relaxation of traditional Fourth 
Amendment requirements.37 
The Court employed the special needs doctrine and the balancing test 
in both Vernonia School District v. Acton38 and Board of Education v. 
Earls39 to justify school-sponsored drug testing of certain segments of high 
school student populations as constitutional.40 
 
 
 33. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In these companion cases, the Court found suspicionless 
drug testing of railway employees subject to federal regulations and of customs agents reasonable and 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  
 34. The “special needs doctrine” was first mentioned in New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351-
53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun argued that the balancing test used to validate 
searches based upon less than probable cause had been used only in cases where the government 
exhibited “a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.” Id. at 351 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). This “special needs doctrine,” in addition to the 
majority opinion in T.L.O, “has laid the groundwork for an entire body of case law.” Jennifer E. 
Smiley, Comment, Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High 
School Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 811, 817 
(Winter 2001).  
 35. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 353 (Blackmun., J., concurring). See generally Roseann Kitson, Note, High School 
Students, You’re in Trouble: How the Seventh Circuit has Expanded the Scope of Permissible 
Suspicionless Searches in Public Schools, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 851, 856 (1999) (explaining that the 
Court has found “special needs” in public school settings). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 
653 (“We have found . . . ‘special needs’ to exist in the public school context.”). 
 38. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 39. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 40. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822. 
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B. The Reasonableness Requirement and Suspicionless Drug Testing in 
Public Schools 
In Vernonia and Earls, the Supreme Court applied the reasonableness 
balancing test and found that suspicionless drug testing of both student-
athletes and those participating in extracurricular activities is 
constitutional.41 
The Vernonia School District implemented its drug-testing policy in 
the fall of 1989 for the expressed purposes of preventing drug use by 
student-athletes, protecting student-athletes’ health and safety, and 
providing student-athlete drug users with assistance programs.42 A 
Vernonia student-athlete and his parents challenged the policy on Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds,43 and the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the policy.44 
In analyzing the constitutionality of this suspicionless testing, the Court 
began by stating that the reasonableness of the search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes would be determined by “balancing its intrusion on 
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”45 According to the Court, this 
balancing test is appropriate because, within schools, there exist “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” that make the 
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements “impracticable.”46 
In applying the first prong of the balancing test, the Court considered 
the nature of the privacy interests upon which suspicionless drug testing 
intrudes.47 Central to the Court’s analysis was that the subjects of the 
policy were “children, who . . . have been committed to the temporary 
custody of the State as schoolmaster.”48 The Court found that in many 
instances school officials act in loco parentis and that “the 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and 
tutelary responsibility for children.”49 But the Court did not stop at its 
 
 
 41. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 42. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 650. 
 43. Id. at 651-52. The Fourteenth Amendment “extends this constitutional guarantee” of the 
Fourth Amendment “to searches and seizures by state officers.” Id. at 652. School officials are 
considered state actors for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id.  
 44. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 664-65. 
 45. Id. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).  
 46. Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); see also supra notes 34-
37 and accompanying text. 
 47. Id. at 654. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 656-57. The Court acknowledged that it has previously rejected the notion that school 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/7
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finding that students generally have low privacy expectations; it 
determined that the legitimate privacy expectations of student-athletes are 
even lower.50 The Court noted that student-athletes are required to use 
communal changing and shower rooms, “not notable for the privacy they 
afford.”51 In addition, the Court discussed the voluntary nature of 
participation in high school athletics, stating “[b]y choosing to ‘go out for 
the team,’ they [student-athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a 
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students 
generally.”52 The Court asserted that student-athletes should reasonably 
expect intrusions upon their usual rights and privileges as part of the price 
of participating in high school sports.53 
The Court next considered the second prong of the balancing test: the 
nature of the intrusion by the school pursuant to the testing policy.54 Here, 
the Court considered both the process of collecting the students’ urine 
samples55 as well as the information disclosed by those samples.56 It found 
that the privacy interests compromised by the testing policy were 
insignificant,57 especially considering that the samples were collected 
under conditions that were, according to the Court, comparable to those 
 
 
officials “exercise only parental power over their students” but stated that this rejection actually 
emphasized the custodial and tutelary power exercised by school administrators. Id. at 655; see also 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. The Vernonia court stated  
while denying that the State’s power over schod children is formally no more than the 
delegated power of their parents, T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature 
of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that 
could not be exercised over free adults. 
Id. at 655.  
 The Vernonia court also noted that public schoolchildren are required to submit to various 
physical examinations and vaccinations, and that at least regarding such medical procedures, “students 
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population 
generally.” Id. at 657 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring)). These requirements 
are seen by some as support for the proposition that drug testing should be mandated for all students. 
See Cagnetti, supra note 3.  
 50. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 658. 
 55. Id. Under Vernonia’s policy, male students chosen for drug testing produced samples at 
urinals along the restroom wall, remaining fully clothed and observed only from behind (if at all). Id. 
The female students chosen for testing produced samples from behind the door of a closed restroom 
stall, monitored aurally by a female (presumably some sort of school administrator) standing outside 
the stall. Id. 
 56. As for the information disclosed by the tests, the Court noted that the tests are designed to 
identify only the presence of drugs and not any medical conditions or other health information. Id.  
 57. Id. at 658-60. With regard to the collection of samples, the Court stated that the intrusion 
upon students’ privacy interest was “negligible.” Id. at 658. 
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encountered in public restrooms.58 The Court also noted that the tests were 
designed solely to identify the presence of drugs and not other medical 
conditions such as pregnancy or epilepsy59 and that the results were 
distributed only amongst those who needed the information.60 Finally, the 
Court found that the policy did not carry with it any criminal sanctions or 
academic consequences for violations.61 
After determining that student-athletes have reduced expectations of 
privacy and that drug testing is an insignificant intrusion upon that 
privacy, the Court turned to the third prong of the balancing test: “the 
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern . . . and the efficacy of 
this means [the drug testing program] for meeting it.”62 The Court found 
that the school’s interest in deterring drug use was “important—indeed, 
perhaps compelling,”63 and that this interest was augmented by an 
additional interest in the health and safety of student-athletes.64 As Justice 
Scalia stated: “it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed 
more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate 
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport 
is particularly high.”65 The Court also found that the school’s concern was 
immediate based upon the lower court’s conclusion that the disciplinary 
problems resulting from drug abuse in the Vernonia School District had 
reached “epidemic proportions,” especially with regard to student-athletes, 
believed to be the leaders of the drug culture.66 Finally, the Court found it 
“self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the ‘role model’ effect 
of athletes’ drug use” would be addressed effectively by a drug-testing 
policy that focused upon those students.67 
After taking into account the student-athletes’ lowered expectations of 
privacy, the minimal intrusion upon that privacy, the seriousness of the 
drug problem, and the effectiveness of the testing policy in addressing that 
 
 
 58. Id. at 658; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 59. See supra note 56. The challengers to the policy also suggested that the testing procedures 
were intrusive because of the necessity of disclosing prescription drug use in order to avoid false 
positives. Id. at 659. The Court concluded, however, that the policy may have permitted such 
disclosure in a “confidential manner” and therefore the Court would not “assume the worst,” i.e., that a 
student’s general health information would be publicly disclosed. Id. at 660. 
 60. Id. at 658. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 660. 
 63. Id. at 661. 
 64. Id. at 662.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 662-63 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
 67. Id. at 663. 
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problem, the Court concluded that Vernonia’s drug-testing policy was 
reasonable, “and hence constitutional.”68  
In June 2002, the Supreme Court again considered a school’s 
suspicionless drug-testing policy; in Board of Education v. Earls,69 the 
Supreme Court held constitutional a school drug-testing policy aimed not 
just at student-athletes but at all students participating in athletics and/or 
extracurricular activities.70 
In Earls, the Court employed the same “special needs” doctrine71 and 
the same three-part balancing test that it utilized in Vernonia.72 Turning 
first to the nature of the students’ privacy interests, the Court focused on 
the diminished privacy interests of all schoolchildren.73 The policy’s 
challengers, two Tecumseh High School students and their parents,74 
argued that even though all students have lowered expectations of privacy, 
the expectations of those participating in extracurricular activities are 
greater than those of student-athletes because participation in 
extracurricular activities does not require a medical exam or involve 
communal undress, factors on which the Vernonia court focused.75 The 
Court responded by stating that those factors were “not essential to our 
decision in Vernonia, which depended primarily upon the school’s 
custodial responsibility and authority.”76 The Court went on to state that 
students participating in extracurricular activities volunteered for many of 
the same types of privacy intrusions as student-athletes,77 and concluded 
that students participating in extracurricular activities have a “limited 
expectation of privacy.”78  
Analyzing prong two, the nature of the intrusion posed by the policy, 
the Court noted that the procedures for collecting the urine samples were 
 
 
 68. Id. at 665.  
 69. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  
 70. Id. at 838. 
 71. Id. at 829 (finding “‘special needs’ inhere in the public school context”). 
 72. The Earls Court characterized the Vernonia test as a “fact-specific balancing of the intrusion 
on the children’s Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.” Id. at 830 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652-53)).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 826-27. 
 75. Id. at 831; see Vernonia Sch. Dist., supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
 76. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831. The Court stated that the communal undress and medical exam 
factors in Vernonia were supplemental in nature and that the school context itself was “central” and 
“the most significant element.” Id. at n.3 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654, 665).  
 77. Id. at 831-32. The Court noted that some extracurricular clubs and activities require 
communal undress and that the activities are, like high school sports, regulated, which “further 
diminishes the expectation of privacy among schoolchildren.” Id. at 832. 
 78. Id. at 832. 
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“even less problematic” than the methods employed by the Vernonia 
School District, intrusions which the Vernonia court considered 
negligible.79 In addition, the Court determined that the test results were 
distributed only on a “need-to-know” basis80 and were not used for law 
enforcement purposes or for the imposition of academic consequences or 
discipline.81 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the invasion of students’ 
privacy under the policy was insignificant.82  
Finally, the Court considered the third prong of the balancing test: the 
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the effectiveness 
of the policy in addressing that concern.83 The Court first reiterated its 
Vernonia findings regarding every school’s important interest in 
preventing drug use.84 Additionally, the Court discussed a few specific 
instances of drug use at Tecumseh High School, but emphasized that “a 
demonstrated problem of drug abuse . . . is not in all cases necessary to the 
validity of a testing regime,”85 and stated “it would make little sense to 
require a school district to wait for a substantial portion of its students to 
begin using drugs before it was allowed to institute a drug testing program 
designed to deter drug use.”86 The Court, citing Vernonia, conceded that 
“there might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the 
 
 
 79. Id. at 833 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658). The Court found the testing procedures 
employed by the Vernonia School District and Tecumseh Public Schools to be “virtually identical,” 
except the Tecumseh policy provided additional protection for students’ privacy because males were 
allowed to produce samples behind closed stall doors rather than at urinals. Id. at 832-33; see also 
supra note 55. 
 80. Id. at 833; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 81. Earls, 536 U.S. at 833. The Court noted that “the only consequence of a failed drug test is to 
limit the student’s privilege of participating in extracurricular activities.” Id. at 833.  
 The Tecumseh Public Schools Activity Student Drug Testing Policy, the policy at issue in Earls, 
contains consequences for three levels of offense. TECUMSEH, OKLA., TECUMSEH PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
ACTIVITY STUDENT DRUG TESTING POLICY (Oct. 1998) [hereinafter “Tecumseh Policy”], available at 
http://www.tecunseh.k12.ok.us/DRUGTEN1.htm. For the first failed drug test, the student’s parent or 
guardian is contacted and must meet with the student, athletic director, and principal. Id. The student 
may continue participating in his or her activity so long as the student and the parent or guardian show 
proof that the student has received drug counseling and the student submits to a second drug test 
administered within two weeks. Id. For the second offense under the policy, the student is suspended 
from participation in all activities for 14 calendar days and must complete four hours of substance 
abuse education and counseling; the student is also randomly tested monthly for the remainder of the 
school year. Id. For the third offense in the same school year, the student is completely suspended 
from participation in all extracurricular activities for the remainder of the school year or 88 school 
days, whichever is longer. Id.  
 82. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62).  
 85. Id. at 835 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)) (holding state statute 
requiring suspicionless drug testing for political candidates unconstitutional). 
 86. Id. at 836. 
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trial court’s finding that the drug problem was ‘fueled by the “role model” 
effect of athletes’ drug use,’”87 but stated that “such a finding was not 
essential to the holding.”88 The Court concluded that the testing of students 
participating in extracurricular activities effectively served the legitimate 
governmental purpose of “preventing and deterring drug use.”89  
Based upon its analysis of the three factors explained above, the Earls 
Court determined the policy of drug testing all students participating in 
sports or extracurricular activities was constitutional.90 In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that a proper application of the Vernonia balancing test 
would have resulted in a different holding by the majority.91 She found 
that while “[t]he Vernonia district sought to test a subpopulation of 
students distinguished by their reduced expectation of privacy, their 
special susceptibility to drug-related injury, and their heavy involvement 
with drug use,” the Tecumseh School District sought to test a larger group 
of students indistinguishable, by any of those factors, from the general 
student body.92  
III. ANALYSIS  
After Vernonia and Earls, the potential coverage of school drug testing 
policies is unclear. Consider, for example, some hypothetical questions 
with which schools might be grappling: First, who can be tested?93 Can 
 
 
 87. Id. at 837-38 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663). 
 88. Id. at 838. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 853-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 93. Some scholars, writing after Vernonia, concluded that the testing of student-athletes would 
be the outer limit of constitutional drug-testing policies. See W. Bradley Colwell, Commentary, 
Beyond Vernonia: When has a School District Drug Testing Policy Gone Too Far?, 131 EDUC. L. 
REP. 547, 557 (Mar. 1999). The author bases his conclusions upon several important factors. He 
argues, first, “[t]he three tier Vernonia test . . . cannot legally sustain drug testing policies beyond the 
scope of athletes.” Id. The author focuses on the nature of students’ privacy interests as the most 
important aspect of the test and asserts that “very few activities other than athletics have an 
expectation of total communal undress.” Id. He also claims that “essential differences exist between 
athletic and non-athletic expectations of privacy, many of which strike at the heart of Vernonia. As a 
result, districts should only randomly test students voluntarily participating in activities that have a 
lessened expectation of privacy and should not broaden the scope beyond athletics.” Id. at 559. He also 
asserts that “every policy must be in response to a substance abuse problem that exists for the specified 
population being tested, not based on the overall drug use in the district.” Id. at 558 (citing Trinidad 
Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1103 (Colo. 1998)).  
 See also Tamara A. Dugan, Note, Putting the Glee Club to the Test: Reconsidering Mandatory 
Suscpicionless Drug Testing of Students Participating in Extracurricular Activities, 28 J. LEGIS. 147 
(2002). The author, writing before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Earls, predicted that  
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based upon the Court’s reasoning in Vernonia, the application of that decision by various 
federal courts to the testing of students as a condition of participation in non-athletic 
extracurricular activities, and the Court’s analysis in Chandler, it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court will rule in Earls that suspicionless drug testing of students who desire to 
participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities is unconstitutional. 
Id. at 174. Her prediction was based upon the “notable differences” in the privacy interests of student-
athletes and those of students participating in extracurricular activities. Id. She states “[e]xtracurricular 
clubs and activities do not require communal undress and showering, a preseason physical exam, or 
the procurement of health insurance—factors that the Vernonia Court cited as evidence of an athlete’s 
diminished expectation of privacy.” Id. at 175 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657). In addition, the 
author cites differences between testing student-athletes and testing those involved in extracurricular 
activities with regard to the efficacy of the testing program in addressing the nature of the state’s 
concern. Id. She asserts that while the Court in Vernonia found that drug use posed a greater physical 
safety risk for student-athletes and that the student-athletes were the leaders of the drug problem at the 
high school, “drug use by members of the math club or the glee club does not carry with it any danger 
to the user or to others greater than that involved with drug use by a student not participating in 
extracurricular activities.” Id. at 175-76.  
 Clearly, the above-mentioned authors were proven wrong when the Supreme Court decided Earls. 
See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text. Other scholars, however, writing post-Vernonia, 
correctly predicted that Vernonia alone opened the door to drug testing many more groups of students. 
Some of these authors asserted that Vernonia may have paved the way for testing entire student 
populations. See Bursch, supra note 11. The author correctly predicted that Vernonia would allow a 
finding that “students in athletics and students in extracurricular activities hold essentially the same 
privacy expectations.” Id. at 1245. He also discusses the possibility of drug testing by random 
selection from an entire student body, and asserts that although the lack of voluntariness in mere 
school attendance could prove problematic,  
[a] judicial finding that the absence of voluntary participation does not make a significant 
difference in determining students’ reasonable expectation of privacy . . . would be consistent 
with recent Supreme Court precedent . . . In addition, past Supreme Court cases justifying 
Fourth Amendment intrusions based on the voluntariness of participants included several 
cases where the “choice” may have been illusory because the alternatives were impractical or 
infeasible. 
Id. at 1260 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656). Bursch believes that because 
students already have lowered expectations of privacy based upon the requirements that all students 
have physical exams and vaccinations, combined with the “custodial character of the school 
environment,” a finding of “a severely reduced expectation of privacy for any student . . . would be 
consistent with [Vernonia].” Id. at 1246-47. 
 Bursch also discusses whether schools must show a specific drug abuse problem before 
implementing drug testing. Id. at 1249. He states, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has not hesitated to uphold 
drug testing in nonschool contexts where an employer could not show an increase in, or even a 
problem with, drug use.” Id. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-69). He argues that a school’s lack of a 
specific drug problem “should not prohibit the court from finding that a school has a legitimate interest 
in deterring student drug use.” Id. at 1250. These predictions were proven accurate by the Earls Court. 
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. The author concludes by stating “[a]lthough the 
constitutionality of a random drug testing program for an entire student body is a closer call than 
testing solely for student athletes, the state’s important interest and the test’s minimal intrusiveness 
still should outweigh the students’ expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1251. 
 Bursch was not alone in his belief that Vernonia might be used to allow testing of entire student 
populations. See also Bill O. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 
1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 71 (Winter 1999). The author here, writing post-Vernonia, states that “[a]s 
the drug problem is recognized as more inclusive than merely an athletic dilemma, it is foreseeable 
that school-wide drug testing could be introduced, coinciding with school-wide bag searches and metal 
detectors.” Id. at 115. He suggests that schools might start testing students in extracurricular clubs 
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schools test all students who want to drive to school and park on school 
property, since they voluntarily do so? 94 Can schools test students who 
have been suspended for fighting, or students who are truant? 95 Could a 
 
 
based upon findings of drug problems in those clubs or might randomly test or search students 
attending school dances or athletic events. Id. The author asserts that “[a]fter the liberal application of 
the T.L.O reasonableness test in Vernonia, few courts will question a school official’s increased 
regulation as long as there exists some statistical or testimonial evidence of an increased problem with 
discipline, drugs or violence.” Id.  
 94. The Supreme Court has not yet considered a drug-testing policy applicable to student drivers. 
However, the Indiana Court of Appeals assessed such a policy in Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp. 
v. Joy, 768 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In discussing the third prong of the balancing test, the 
nature and immediacy of the governmental interest, the court in Penn-Harris-Madison found that 
while the school had a “strong interest in preventing impaired students from driving while under the 
influence of ‘intoxicants,’” the interest did not encompass testing student drivers for nicotine. Id. at 
950-51. The court found a lack of any evidence that the use of nicotine while driving poses any serious 
risks, and therefore decided that while student drivers could be tested for alcohol and other drugs, the 
school could not constitutionally test student drivers for nicotine. Id. at 951. The special nicotine 
holding applied only to student drivers and not to students tested because of their participation in 
extracurricular activities. Id.  
 This holding by the Indiana Court of Appeals was based in part on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis 
of a similar policy in Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000). The 
court in that case found that “this expansive view of the School’s interest goes too far,” and held 
random drug testing of student drivers for the presence of nicotine unconstitutional. Id. at 1064, 1067. 
 Based on these cases, one could argue that a school district could impose testing upon students 
who drive to school, provided that the tests are designed to discover only alcohol and other drugs 
excluding nicotine. 
 95. See Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998). The court found, 
first, that there was no evidence of any reasonable suspicion to justify drug testing students suspended 
for fighting. Id. at 419-20. The court based this portion of its holding on a strict Terry balancing test. 
See supra note 7 (state interest in search must be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion). 
Next, the court held that drug testing suspended students could not be justified under a special needs 
analysis. Id. at 423. The court analyzed the policy using the test set out in Vernonia: the nature of the 
students’ privacy interests, the state’s concern, and the efficacy of the policy in furthering state 
interests. Id. at 421. Under the first prong, the court determined that while the nature of the privacy 
interests was similar to that of the Vernonia students, it differed in two important respects: First, 
“given the ‘element of “communal undress” inherent in athletic participation,’ athletes have an even 
lesser privacy expectation than the general student population.” Id. at 421-22 (quoting Scheill v. 
Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1998)). Second, the court determined 
that the Vernonia holding emphasized the voluntariness of participation that led to drug testing, and 
that the students suspended for fighting could not be considered as having volunteered for any activity 
which might lead to drug testing. Id. at 422.  
 Under prong two of the balancing test, the court found that the nature of the state’s interests in the 
case at bar was substantially similar to those in Vernonia. Id. at 423.  
 The court found the testing program at issue deficient under the final prong of the test, the efficacy 
of the testing program in furthering state interests. Id. at 423-24. The court determined the Vernonia 
holding was based in part upon the fact that a drug-testing program focused on student-athletes but 
based upon individualized suspicion would “entail[] substantial difficulties—if it were indeed 
practicable at all.” Id. at 423 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 663). According to the court, the 
same could not be found in this case. The school failed to provide evidence that a program of 
individualized suspicion, the constitutionally preferable type of program, would not work for drug 
testing students who were suspended from school. Id. at 424-25.  
 The court’s analysis in Willis illuminates the factors that the Seventh Circuit found to be most 
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school test any student who volunteered for any non-mandatory activity: a 
school dance, a field trip, an honors class, a service project? 
In addition, for which drugs may schools test? Can schools test for 
nicotine use, a drug that is legal once the user reaches a certain age? 96 
As for the punishment aspects of drug-testing policies, must a school’s 
policy mandate counseling as pre-requisite to regaining participation 
privileges after a student is suspended from activities for failing a drug 
test?97 Does it matter whether the consequences of one failed drug test 
 
 
crucial to the Vernonia decision: the lack of voluntary participation in an activity leading to drug 
testing and a finding that a program based upon individualized suspicion would not be feasible. 
Arguably, were the Supreme Court faced with a similar fact scenario, it might conclude in accordance 
with the Seventh Circuit.  
 However, the Supreme Court might find that students who misbehave have voluntarily placed 
themselves in the position to be drug tested due to their failure to behave appropriately. If a school 
could provide compelling evidence of a link between poor behavior and drug use, the Court might be 
persuaded that the school’s compelling interests override the need for individualized suspicion. The 
Court had already found that programs based upon individualized suspicion are difficult to implement. 
The Vernonia Court stated, “testing based on ‘suspicion’ of drug use would not be better, but worse.” 
515 U.S. at 664. 
 96. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding drug testing policy 
designed to discover alcohol, drugs, and nicotine constitutional, even in the case of student drivers). 
But see Joy, supra note 94 (finding drug testing of student drivers for the presence of nicotine 
unconstitutional). Based upon these two decisions, it appears that testing extracurricular participants 
and athletes for the presence of nicotine would be constitutionally acceptable, and that testing student 
drivers for substances other than nicotine would be constitutionally acceptable, but testing student 
drivers for nicotine would not be acceptable. However, the Supreme Court has not considered this 
issue. Neither the Vernonia nor the Earls policies applied to student drivers and neither policy tested 
for the presence of nicotine. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 47J, STUDENT DRUG TESTING POLICY 
(Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter “Vernonia Policy”]. 
 97. See BREMEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, BREMEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 
DRUG TESTING POLICY (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter “Bremen Policy”]. This policy provides that when a 
student tests positive for the presence of drugs, the school nurse or athletic director will meet with the 
student and his parent or guardian and provide the names of counseling or assistance agencies that the 
family may want to contact for help with drug problems. Id. However, counseling is not mandated in 
the “punishment” section of the policy as a pre-requisite to regaining participation privileges. Id. 
 Bremen’s policy, effective October 1, 2002, was implemented in response to both the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Earls and the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision in Penn-Harris-
Madison School Corp. v. Joy, 768 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Telephone Interview with Mark 
Wagner, Attorney, Bremen Public School Corporation (Jan. 26, 2003). Though many Indiana schools 
had drug-testing policies in place prior to 2000, most testing was suspended due to a state appellate 
court decision holding that the Indiana Constitution required a showing of individualized suspicion 
before schools could drug test students. Id. That decision was overruled, however, by the Supreme 
Court of Indiana in Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002). In Penn-Harris-
Madison, the Indiana Court of Appeals assessed the drug-testing policy at issue according to the test 
and findings set out by that court in Linke. The Penn-Harris-Madison policy mandated testing for all 
student-athletes, participants in extracurricular activities, and students wishing to drive to school and 
park their cars on school property. The court found that the policy was constitutional under the Indiana 
Constitution’s search and seizure provisions.  
 Whether drug testing policies are constitutional under various state constitutions is not within the 
scope of this Note. It is important to recognize, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Earls 
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involve mandatory parent-administrator meetings and counseling, or 
suspension from participation in extracurricular activities for a period of 
time?98 
To answer these questions, one must understand the facts that were 
essential to the decisions in Vernonia and Earls. Turning to the first prong 
of the three-part test employed by the Court in both cases,99 the key factor 
appears to be the reduced expectations of privacy among students 
generally rather than the reduced expectations of privacy resulting from 
communal undress and/or the necessity of physical examinations.100 In 
Vernonia, the Court seemed to limit its holding to situations in which 
students had particularly low expectations of privacy,101 emphasizing, 
“[s]chool sports are not for the bashful,” and noting the lack of privacy 
afforded by school locker rooms.102 However, when forced to consider the 
privacy interests of those participating not in locker room scenes but in 
academic competitions and after-school clubs, the Court recanted its 
limiting language focusing on communal undress and instead devoted its 
discussion to the reduced privacy interests of students generally.103 In 
response to the students’ argument that because they were not subject to 
communal undress and physical exams they had higher expectations of 
privacy than did student-athletes, the Court stated, “[t]his distinction . . . 
 
 
may not remove all barriers to drug testing students involved in extracurricular activities. School 
districts must ensure that proposed policies comply with both federal and state constitutional 
provisions. 
 98. See Bremen Policy, supra note 97. The policy contains three levels of punishment for 
positive drug tests. Id. For the first offense, a student is suspended for 25% of the scheduled contests or 
25% of the extracurricular season; for the second offense, the student is suspended from participation 
in activities for one calendar year; for the third offense, the student is suspended from participation in 
all activities for the remainder of the student’s school career. Id. See also Tecumseh Policy, supra note 
81. This policy contains three levels of punishment as well, but they are much less harsh than 
Bremen’s punishments. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 48-53; see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Indeed, commentators have noted the lack of privacy involved in athletics as central to the 
Court’s approval of drug testing for student-athletes. See supra note 93. 
 102. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 103. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32. Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent, noted that unlike student-
athletes, “the modest and shy along with the bold and uninhibited” can all take advantage of non-
athletic extracurricular opportunities. Id. at 847. The Court responded in its opinion by pointing out 
that “[s]ome . . . clubs and activities require occasional off-campus travel and communal undress.” Id. 
at 832. However, Justice Ginsburg countered this fairly transparent argument by explaining, “those 
situations are hardly equivalent to the routine communal undress associated with athletics . . . .” Id. at 
848. Regarding this prong as well as the balancing test generally, Justice Ginsburg argued that had the 
Court properly applied its own balancing test, as set forth in Vernonia, it would have found in favor of 
the students. Id. at 847.  
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was not essential to our decision in Vernonia, which depended primarily 
upon the school’s custodial responsibility and authority.”104  
In assessing students’ privacy interests, the Court in both Vernonia and 
Earls also focused on the voluntary nature of the activities in which 
students subject to drug testing participated.105 The Vernonia Court 
emphasized that the choice to “go out for the team” carried with it a lower 
expectation of privacy and an acceptance of increased governmental 
intrusion.106 The Earls Court agreed, stating that the nature of 
extracurricular activities “further diminishes the expectation of privacy 
among schoolchildren.”107 
Another crucial factor in analyzing the governmental interest in 
Vernonia was the increased risk of physical injury that student-athletes 
face when they abuse drugs.108 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Earls 
corroborates this finding; she states, “[w]e have since confirmed that these 
special risks were necessary to our decision in Vernonia.”109 However, the 
majority in Earls seemed to discount the importance of this factor.110 
When the students argued that the testing of non-athletes did not implicate 
safety issues,111 the Court responded by stating “safety factors into the 
special needs analysis, but the safety interest furthered by drug testing is 
undoubtedly substantial for all children . . . .”112 Justice Ginsburg 
disagreed with the majority’s dismissal of increased safety risks as a key 
part of Vernonia. She points out that “[n]otwithstanding nightmarish 
images of out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas 
disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students 
the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities that are 
not safety sensitive to an unusual degree.”113 Justice Ginsburg argued that 
the two reasons the Vernonia School District used to justify suspicionless 
drug testing, the facts that student-athletes faced special health risks and 
that student-athletes were the leaders of the drug problem at the school, 
 
 
 104. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831. The Court stated further that in deciding Vernonia, “we considered 
the school context ‘central’ and ‘the most significant element.’” Id. at note 3 (citing Vernonia, 515 
U.S. at 654, 665); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Vernonia, supra notes 50-53; see also Earls, supra note 77. 
 106. See Vernonia, supra notes 50-53.  
 107. See supra note 77. 
 108. See supra notes 64-65. 
 109. Earls, 536 U.S. at 851 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317); Ferguson 
v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 87 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 110. Id. at 836-37.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 836. 
 113. Id. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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were not present in the Tecumseh School District, and that “no other 
tenable justification” validated Tecumseh’s testing of every extracurricular 
participant.114 
The pervasiveness of the drug problem in the Vernonia School District 
was also crucial to the Court’s decision in that case.115 The Vernonia Court 
found it important that the testing focused on student-athletes because they 
were the leaders of the drug problem—the role models to whom other 
students looked.116 In Earls, the Court noted “specific evidence of drug use 
at Tecumseh schools”; however, the drug problem there did not appear to 
have reached the epidemic proportions of the problem at Vernonia 
schools.117 The Earls Court mentioned a few specific instances of conduct 
involving drugs but went on to state: “a demonstrated problem of drug 
abuse is not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime.”118 
In light of Earls, the standards set out by the Court in Vernonia are not 
as clear as they first appeared. Does all of the confusion surrounding the 
Court’s holdings mean that schools should simply stick with the “safe” 
policy used by the Tecumseh School District and not attempt to create 
anything even remotely different?119 Though this is one approach schools 
may be taking,120 it is not the only option.  
In fact, the Court’s opinions provide schools with great flexibility to 
implement different drug-testing policies. Obviously, schools can 
constitutionally implement suspicionless drug-testing policies focusing on 
 
 
 114. Id. at 852-53. 
 115. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
 116. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
 117. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834-35; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. See also Earls, 536 U.S. at 849 
(Ginsbury, J., dissenting) (stating “the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern; . . . faced 
by the Vernonia School District dwarded that confronting Tecumseh administrators”). 
 118. Earls, 536 U.S. at 835 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319). The Court went on to state that a 
showing of a specific drug abuse problem does “shore up an assertion of special need for a 
suspicionless general search program” and found that Tecumseh had provided sufficient evidence for 
such a “shoring up.” Id. (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319). The Court actually seems to admit that it 
has held Tecumseh to a lower standard than it first appeared would be required after the Vernonia 
decision; the Court states “it would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a 
substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to institute a drug testing 
program designed to deter drug use.” Id. at 836. Though this statement may in fact be true, this 
language is contrary to the standard that appeared to come out of the Vernonia decision. See Vernonia, 
515 U.S. at 662-63. 
 119. See Lewin, supra note 3. The author quotes Paul Lyle, a lawyer who represents a large 
number of school districts in west Texas: “I tell districts that if they adopt the same verbatim policy as 
Tecumseh [the Earls policy], that would be safe . . . But I tell them, if you change a comma, it could 
open the door to something.” Id. 
 120. See Lewin, supra note 3. The author quotes a Texas lawyer who represents school districts. 
Id. He states, “I tell districts that if they adopt the same verbatim policy as Tecumseh, that would be 
safe . . . But I tell them, if you change a comma, it could open the door to something.” Id. 
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athletes and students participating in extracurricular activities, but it 
appears that policies testing students who voluntarily participate in other 
school activities would also be constitutional.121 Consider, for example, a 
drug-testing policy that mandates testing for all students who choose to 
attend a week-long school bus trip to Washington, D.C. Students 
volunteering for such an excursion are clearly in the care and custody of 
the school officials accompanying them.122 In addition, the students have 
clearly “volunteered” for the activity within the meaning of the word as 
construed in Vernonia.123 There are certainly major safety risks inherent in 
students traveling and spending the night in a distant city while under the 
influence of drugs,124 and students on an overnight trip, spending hours on 
buses together and sleeping four or five students per hotel room, certainly 
have lower expectations of privacy, perhaps even akin to those of student-
athletes.125 It appears that testing these students would comport with all of 
the crucial factors set out by the Court in Vernonia and Earls. In short, 
students “volunteer” for many types of activities, including field trips, 
school dances, honors classes, and even driving privileges, and courts will 
likely find that they therefore have “volunteered” for increased intrusions 
into their privacy. 
Schools also retain significant discretion when it comes to deciding 
which drugs their testing policies will cover. Policies mandating testing for 
 
 
 121. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 49. The chaperones on such a trip are certainly acting, at least in some 
respects, in loco parentis. The court in T.L.O. limited the scope of this doctrine. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 336-37. However, when children are sent off with teachers to live in a hotel for a week, parents have 
certainly delegated some of their power to the school.  
 See also Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the 
T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077 (1991). The author discusses a Sixth Circuit 
decision, Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (1987), in which the court assessed the validity of a 
search that took place off of school grounds, in a hotel, during an overnight band trip. Webb, 828 F.2d 
at 1153-54. In that case, the court distinguished school officials’ roles during overnight school trips 
from the normal day-to-day activities of school administrators. Id. at 1157. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding in T.L.O. rejecting the theory that school officials act only in loco parentis, the Webb 
court found that during overnight school trips, school officials act in part as state actors and in part in 
loco parentis. Id. The court focused on the fact that parental permission was required for the trip and 
that it was a voluntary activity as opposed to normal, mandatory attendance at school. Id. 
 123. See supra note 52. The choice to “go out for the team” is clearly akin to the choice to go out 
on a fieldtrip. Id. 
 124. See supra notes 65, 77. Safety risks, as stated by the Court in Earls, are factors in the special 
needs analysis. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 834-36. Even if courts take the position of Justice Ginsburg, 
dissenting in Earls, that drug testing should be based upon more than just a general safety risk to all 
children who abuse drugs, in the case of children on an overnight fieldtrip, additional safety risks are 
clearly present. See id. at 844-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 125. It may be noted here that while high school student-athletes travel on buses, it is unlikely that 
they travel overnight. Students traveling on overnight trips would arguably have even less of an 
expectation of privacy than student-athletes. 
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the presence of nicotine and alcohol have been accepted by some lower 
courts as constitutional,126 even though these drugs are not illegal once 
students are of age. 
A wide range of punishments for positive drug tests is also 
constitutionally acceptable. The policies at issue in Vernonia and Earls 
contain very different punishment provisions.127 For example, one failed 
drug test at Vernonia High School results in an option of either 
participating in a drug assistance program and submitting to weekly drug 
testing for six weeks or suspension from participation in activities for the 
remainder of the current season and the next athletic season.128 One failed 
drug test at Tecumseh High School results in a meeting between parents, 
student, and school administrators; drug counseling; and voluntary 
submission to a second drug test.129 No suspension from participation in 
activities is involved.130 The only “punishment” provision found in both 
policies that the Court emphasized as necessary was that students were not 
criminally punished or academically disciplined for positive drug tests.131 
Beyond that, whether a policy focuses more on counseling or on 
suspension from participation is not a factor essential to its 
constitutionality.132 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Based on Vernonia and Earls, it is clear that schools need not 
implement drug-testing policies identical to the policies involved in those 
cases. There are, however, several important characteristics crucial to the 
constitutionality of any policy.133 First, schools should include a statement 
of need and purpose, introducing the evidence that the school claims 
supports its concern with, and interest in, drug testing.134 This will provide 
a basis for courts, in assessing prongs two and three of the balancing test, 
 
 
 126. See supra note 96. 
 127. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Vernonia Policy, supra note 96. 
 129. See Tecumseh Policy, supra note 96. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833-34; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.  
 132. See supra note 95. 
 133. Schools should ensure that these provisions are included in order to pass constitutional 
muster. A discussion of whether schools should implement drug testing at all—that is, whether drug 
testing is sound educational policy—is outside the scope of this Note. 
 134. Such a statement is included in Tecumseh’s policy. Tecumseh Policy, supra note 96. Another 
example of such a statement may be found in Bremen’s policy. Bremen Policy, supra note 97. 
Vernonia Policy, supra note 96. 
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to hold that the school has an interest in implementing random drug-
testing policies and that the policy furthers that interest.135 
Next, policies should include provisions emphasizing the non-punitive 
nature of the testing; the policies should not include criminal penalties or 
academic sanctions.136 Neither the Tecumseh nor the Vernonia policies 
provide for academic penalties.137 The Court in both Earls and Vernonia 
agreed that the non-criminal nature of the penalties rendered the intrusion 
into students’ privacy insignificant.138 However, as long as the sanctions 
are not criminal, schools have wide latitude in determining the severity of 
punishments for failed tests.139 Suspension from participation, mandatory 
counseling, and/or parent-administrator meetings are all acceptable 
options.140 
Schools should not implement policies that include provisions 
requiring testing for all students. The Court has continually emphasized 
the voluntary nature of the activities for which students are tested, and this 
is a key factor in the policies’ constitutionality.141 However, schools could 
reach much larger groups of students than the Vernonia and Tecumseh 
policies do; testing simply needs to be limited to groups of students 
defined by set criteria.142 
Furthermore, a constitutionally-sound policy need not respond to 
specific concerns about student safety.143 As discussed in Earls, the safety 
of children generally is sufficient evidence of the state’s interest in 
preventing and deterring drug use.144  
The Court’s opinions make clear that schools have much wider latitude 
to impose drug testing on students than one might have thought after 
reading Vernonia. So long as schools show that students subject to drug 
 
 
 135. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Though the Court stated that Tecumseh High 
School need not have shown a substantial drug problem in order to justify its policy, it would be wise 
to include a statement of need and purpose since the Court does require that the school have some 
interest that supports implementation of the policy. Id. 
 136. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Tecumseh Policy and Vernonia Policy, supra note 96. 
 138. See supra note 131.  
 139. See supra note 132. 
 140. See supra 128-32. 
 141. See supra notes 52-53, 78.  
 142. A school could probably manage to reach nearly every student by implementing a policy that 
mandates testing for all participants in extracurricular activities, all drivers, and even all students who 
volunteer for field trips or other off-campus activities. 
 143. Though such provisions are not constitutionally required they certainly would do no harm. 
See supra note 112. Erring on the side of caution, schools could include these provisions to provide 
additional support for their expressed concerns.  
 144. See supra note 112. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/7
p1123 Rothgery book pages.doc  3/3/2004    
 
 
 
 
 
2003] KIDS, DRUGS, AND SCHOOL INTERVENTION 1145 
 
 
 
 
testing have lower expectations of privacy, they will satisfy the first prong 
of the balancing test, and so long as they implement standard procedures 
for collecting and testing samples and for disseminating the results, the 
nature of the intrusion will be minimal. Schools do not even need to show 
a specific drug problem in their districts before initiating a testing 
program, for the severity of the nation-wide drug program warrants drug 
testing in most circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Vernonia and Earls have left many 
school districts wondering how far they can go in drug testing their 
students. Schools should not assume that the only “safe” policies are those 
that the Supreme Court has specifically ruled upon. It is clear, in analyzing 
the Court’s two opinions, that schools can implement policies unique to 
their specific needs while maintaining the policies’ constitutionality.  
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